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A MANIFEST REVOLUTION: 
ACCESS AND SPECIALIZATION IN LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PRACTICE 
MICHAEL FEINDEU & OLIVIER FULDAUER* 
The rhetoric of crisis states its own truth in 
the mode of error. It itself is radically 
blind to the light it emits. 
Paul de Man, "Criticism and Crisis" 
To many the science of law has become unhinged just as the nuts 
and bolts of Newtonian certainty were loosened by the conflation 
of energy and mass. Though Einstein assuaged the world of human 
action that it could continue with relative safety relying on 
Newtonian physics, the uncertainties of law's brave new world ap-
pear to envelop professional and non-professional alike. One possi-
ble source of this instability is that the legal profession is undergo-
ing a "crisis in legal knowledge." Crisis presumes that we are in a 
transition between stable frameworks, whereas we prefer to ap-
proach this crisis as the recurrent point of departure and return of 
legal thought and legal knowledge. Nonetheless, while mindful of 
the cautions of de Man, the authors have acquiesced for the purpose 
of this comment to the rhetoric of crisis in the hope that it allows us 
to "re-speak" the objectives of legal education and legal practice. 
The new consciousness of legal ignorance stems from the per-
ception that law has become more complex. It is not simply a case 
of there being more rules or regulations, rather, the meaning and 
function of law have become more complicated. Intuitions of jus-
tice, the content of "natural law," have been qualitatively displaced 
by positivist law-making. Legal dilemmas are less easily framed in 
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terms of moral imperatives as law becomes more site-specific, more 
embedded in material circumstance and social histories. 
The law has become more complex because the society it regu-
lates has become more complex. More decisions need to be made 
because more choices exist, and in this sense, law attempts to struc-
ture a society that is increasingly defined-though this logic ex-
ceeds the very notion of "definition"-by its variance with itself, 
defined not by what it is but by the possibilities of what it can be 
or, alternatively, by what it is not. Only in rhetoric can the organi-
zation we call society be reduced to one set of values or to a single 
overarching principle of social cohesion-if indeed cohesion is easily 
distinguished from tension. 
The forces effecting the articulation and construction of the law 
resist any simple or holistic characterization of legal knowledge. 
The decomposition of the unity of legal knowledge has meant that 
its content no longer submits to any one end; it is no longer evident 
to say for whom or for what it is, or should be, composed. This 
predicament does not, however, release us from the need to decide 
and re-decide these questions. It is in view of these issues that a new 
perspective on legal education and legal practice is offered. 
While critics of legal institutions have identified both the prob-
lem of wider access to legal knowledge and the increasing special-
ization of legal knowledge, rare is it that these cuts are made by the 
same sword. Typically, proponents of access to the law oppose the 
concentration of special knowledge in the hands of an elite whose 
access to 'legal institutions is primarily based on socio-economic 
privilege. The "crisis" of legal knowledge has painted a picture that 
hints at even greater elitism: the knowledge lawyers require to 
function effectively in society is due to become even more removed 
from the civilian denominator of "common sense." 
We contend in this comment that the aims of wider access and 
of specialization can be viewed in complementary terms. 
1. Legal Knowledge 
In a recent lecture delivered at Dalhousie Law School, Harry W. 
Arthurs, professor of law at York University, argued, "we are in the 
midst of a fundamental shift in the nature of legal knowledge 
which may in the end fundamentally transform the legal profes-
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sion."1 Failure to grasp this shift has produced a profound episte-
mological break between how legal knowledge is taught and assimi-
lated by lawyers and how law manifests itself in society. Not only 
are lawyers overwhelmed by the exponential growth of what 
Arthurs designates as "technical knowledge" (information about le-
gal rules and procedures) or by the fragmentation of "craft knowl-
edge" (practical information and techniques of "good lawyering"), 
they "know least about [what] is becoming more and more impor-
tant," namely "systemic knowledge," the "knowledge of law as a 
social system. "2 
Arthurs points to several consequences of this "explosion" of 
knowledge. The increase of technical information has put pressure 
on the profession to recognize the need for specialization in legal 
training and practice, and the growing importance of "systemic" 
knowledge argues for greater recognition of both the interdisci-
plinary and non-profession based sources of legal knowledge. As 
Arthurs notes, these developments profoundly challenge the tradi-
tional representation the legal profession has of itself: 
Central to the very notion of a profession is the existence 
of a common body of knowledge which binds its mem -
bers together, and which defines the profession's relation-
ship to clients, the state, and to other groups in society. 
In the case of the legal profession, belief in the existence 
of such a common body of knowledge is reflected in our 
continued adherence to a single model of education and 
training, a singular practise credential, a single code of 
professional ethics, a single standard of competence, a 
single constituency of electors for the governing body, a 
single catalogue of professional honours, a single reper-
toire of professional regulatory strategies. 
But with the growth of knowledge and the diversifi-
cation of knowledge, that common core has ceased to ex-
ist. The desire to know, the need to know, the resources 
to know have divided us into subprofessions clustered 
around differing bodies of knowledge. Furthermore, 
these subprofessions are increasingly defined by non-
lawyer collaborators with whom they work, and the par-
1 H. W. Arthurs, "A Lot of Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Will the Legal 
Profession Survive the Knowledge Explosion?" (Paper presented to Dalhousie Law 
School, 24 November 1994) at 2 [unpublished]. 
2 Ibid at 5, 6. 
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ticular clientele they serve. As a consequence, the notion 
of a single unified legal profession is becoming increas-
ingly less plausible. 3 
It is noteworthy that Arthurs' remarks were directed at an audience 
of law students, legal academics, and practitioners. He warned his 
listeners that he would be saying "some difficult things ... about 
Canada's legal profession,"4 but Arthurs himself appears at times 
ambivalent towards these developments. The profession, he warns, 
must take up the challenge presented by the fundamental changes 
in legal knowledge, but at the same time in doing this we will "find 
it extremely difficult to maintain our collective identity as a pro-
fession."5 Thus, the difference emerging between legal knowledge 
as a whole and the knowledge that is the domain of the profession 
is recognized as a source of tension which the profession must over-
come if it is to retain its cohesion. It is this point that the authors 
wish to seize upon. 
i. Specialization 
Specialization in law is a practical reality. What lawyers can know 
individually no longer circumscribes the possibilities of knowledge 
in the field we call "law." The likelihood that, as Arthurs observes, 
we will have to accept that "lawyers must become expert in some 
fields of knowledge and know very little about others"6 is already 
manifest in legal practice. Lawyers no longer "know everything." 
The teaching apparatus, however, has failed to adapt to this 
reality. Law schools remain committed to the outdated model of 
training lawyers who can "do anything." The problem with com-
plete reliance on this generalist approach is that there is less and less 
a connection between the content of legal education and the de-
mands of the practicing lawyer. Students graduate with a broad but 
imprecise knowledge; few manage to acquire an expertise in any 
specific area.7 With the marginalization of knowledge, emphasis is 
placed on ranking students rather than on training students, and 
3 Ibid. at 20-21. 
4 Ibid. at 2. 
5 Ibid. at9. 
G Ibid. at 10. 
7 Some exceptions do exist, for example, in criminal or corporate law or in 
programs combined with other degrees. 
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ranking, in turn, becomes more formalistic and arbitrary, having 
little relation to skill or expertise. 
Of course, there are unattractive side-effects to this phenomena. 
Compared to other fields in the academy, law schools are notorious 
for their pedagogical cynicism, as the knowledge factor is increas-
ingly subordinated to a kind of social Darwinism of separating the 
cream from the milk. The curriculum remains a hodge-podge of 
courses with little or no program structuring or integration. Course 
syllabi are over-ambitious, more suited to the demands of produc-
ing a reliable bell-curve than to the assimilation of expertise. 8 This, 
in turn, is reinforced by an examination system oriented to a repre-
sentative rather than comprehensive evaluation of knowledge. 
These developments are inevitable when legal knowledge is 
marginalized. Within the context of legal education, specialization 
would enhance the rationalization of the institution. It would in-
crease the efficiency of legal training by producing graduates with a 
greater degree of expertise than is currently the case. 
Specialization would also expand the program options available. 
Under the present system, for example, business law tends to 
dominate the curriculum. Without question, the importance of 
corporate law is based on the commercial realities of legal practice, 
but in the absence of other distinct fields of legal knowledge in law 
school curricula, business law has become the only field in which a 
student can acquire some depth. True, factors beyond the control of 
law schools-the articling process being the most conspicuous-
have contributed to this problem. Nevertheless, business law has be-
come the essential content of the "generalist" degree in law even 
though it remains open to debate whether this answers the needs of 
the business law specialist. 
ii. Law Beyond Lawyers 
There is a second point to be drawn from the fact that we can no 
longer rely on a notion of a unified legal knowledge. Arthurs ob-
serves that specialization will have the effect of undermining the 
"common body of knowledge which binds its members together."9 
We might take the liberty to translate this statement: in other 
8 In other words, if a course were designed where the materials were likely to be 
thoroughly covered, separating the cream from the milk becomes that much more 
difficult. 
9 Supra note 1 at 20. 
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words, after specialization, something of "law" remains. 
Specialization thus has the effect of breaking the profession's 
monopoly over legal knowledge. Perhaps in contrast to the tenor of 
Arthurs' comments, the authors hold that this development is long 
overdue. The tendency to collapse legal knowledge with legal prac-
tice has cut off dialogue with other disciplines and slowed devel-
opments in legal methodology. What interdisciplinary or method-
ological initiatives do exist are confined to the margins of legal 
scholarship, and more importantly, the academy at large offers no 
real locus for formal study in these areas. To take an example, it 
would not be easy to pursue studies in the "sociology of law" since 
neither discipline, sociology or law, has a sophisticated grasp of the 
other's sphere of knowledge. The same could be said in regards to 
legal history, law and religion, law and political theory, law and 
medicine, law and literature, and so on. Furthermore, to reflect on 
the character and development of law without recourse to the other 
humanities is to wind up with a field of study condemned to a two-
dimensional self-awareness, with only its own points of reference 
against which to gauge itself. 
Those who oppose the introduction of interdisciplinary influ-
ence in the law curricula have failed to appreciate the growing posi-
tivistic nature of legal knowledge. Modern law finds itself having to 
broker a variety of interests and the merits of its decisions lie less 
often in some latent moral imperative than realizing a social consen-
sus on a given issue. While such concerns may lie beyond the prac-
tice of the average lawyer-and Arthurs argues that even this may 
not be so 10-it would hardly be fair to say that they lie beyond the 
purview of legal knowledge. 
Furthermore, it is misleading to characterize legal practice 
solely in terms of the adversarial process. Even within the traditional 
lawyering context, only a very small portion of legal work is re-
solved through judicial disposition. Sound legal drafting, negotiat-
10 Arthurs acknowledges, supra note 1 at 9, that some lawyers may feel that such 
concerns are beyond the scope of the profession, bur he counters by stating: 
All true, to a degree. But many lawyers do advise clients on just 
such matters, Charter litigation being the prime case in point; 
lots of lawyers do become civil servants, academics, editorial 
writers, politicians ... and as a profession, we collectively 
pontificate on precisely the issues about which we profess 
individual ignorance and no need to know. 
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ing skills, and legal planning, are more commonly the tools most 
lawyers need to acquire. Nevertheless, the profession persists in 
promoting the image of the lawyer as hired gun. The narrowness of 
this perspective may perhaps explain the growing use of arbitrators 
and mediators. Today, clients often seek a timely and inexpensive 
resolution to disputes, recognizing that both sides have interests to 
protect and welcoming any mediation which can best accomplish 
that result. The advantages of this approach over recourse to litiga-
tion are obvious. 
Alternative dispute resolution, we suspect, marks only the tip of 
the iceberg. As law expands its influence in everyday life, it is 
likely that the people will seek out means of resolution other than 
through expensive legal counsel. 
2. Access 
Once it is recognized that legal knowledge serves more than one 
master, that its scope and relevance exceed the confines of the pro-
fession, that it no longer serves to identify a community of profes-
sionals or practitioners or academics, the rationale that has so long 
sustained the professional monopoly over the management and dis-
semination of this knowledge falls to the wayside. Debate and re-
form over access to legal education is certainly nothing new, but 
more often than not lobbying for greater access has primarily tar-
geted the profession's tendency to privilege certain socio-economic 
groups as well as exclude other groups. Access to legal education 
has thus been equated with access to the profession. We are by no 
means questioning the value of these debates. Far from it. The 
diversification of legal knowledge, however, challenges the very 
premise that entrance into the profession serve as the criterion for 
access to legal education. In a word, diversification is not 
accommodated by expanding the club membership, it is answered 
by turning the club into a university. 
Our position is that a student accepted to university should have 
no more difficulty entering a program in the study of law than a 
student wishing to enter into the study of chemistry or English 
literature. Perhaps there has never been any moral authority for the 
distinction drawn between law school admission and general ad-
mission to the universities housing those schools. The justification 
that has traditionally been put forth, however, has relied on the 
premise that knowledge of the law is the sole purview of the profes-
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sionals who practice law. Their unique knowledge equips them bet-
ter than anyone else to determine the knowledge requirements and 
standards of practice applied to their own ranks. Consequently, 
such professionals are vested, as Arthurs puts it, with "the sole right 
to determine on what terms that knowledge will be made avail-
able." 11 
Diversification undermines both the rationale of excluding the 
general university population access to legal knowledge and the 
characterization of the study of law as an activity solely devoted to 
the production of lawyers. Specialization in legal knowledge an-
swers to the needs of the profession and at the same time redefines 
professional knowledge as a subset of the much broader project of 
the study of law. 
3. Practical Proposals 
Our position that specialization and wider access to legal knowl-
edge are complementary, and not mutually exclusive goals, raises 
interesting questions about how such ideas might be brought into 
practice. This comment is not the place for elaborating the practical 
details of bringing about what we have argued is a much needed 
(and desired) reform. Such limits have nevertheless not prevented 
us from considering certain options. 
i. Law School 
We have no fixed proposal for a reorganization of the law curricu-
lum which would accommodate both the specialist and non-special-
ist study of law. Some options were considered and debated. For 
example, we considered a two-tiered program consisting of an un-
dergraduate and graduate component. Any university student 
would be eligible to enroll in undergraduate law courses. At the un-
dergraduate level, students would combine two years of regular 
undergraduate study with two years of an undergraduate law cur-
riculum. Those wishing to specialize could continue their education 
at the more competitive graduate level. The graduate program 
would primarily attract those interested in legal practice and those 
interested in advanced studies. 
The same ends might just as easily be met by simply 
"deregulating" the law school altogether. A curriculum offering 
I I Supra note 1 at 3. 
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structured programs is perhaps more easily navigated by the diverse 
variety of interests seeking legal education. Increased cross-listing of 
courses from other disciplines would also enhance the range of in-
terdisciplinary studies. 
ii. The Practicum 
As far as we know, there is no other professional program which 
leaves the access to the required practicum in the hands of the pri-
vate sector to the extent that it is in law. There is no question that 
the articling process, as it now stands, is failing to achieve its objec-
tive. Few would argue that there is any sense in spending thousands 
of public and private dollars training law students for three years 
only to deny their entry into the profession on account of the un-
availability of articling positions. The failure of both the bar soci-
eties and the private law firms who benefit from the articling pro-
gram to address the breakdown of this system forces us to consider 
whether these bodies are the right ones to play such a decisive role 
in the management of this critical element of the law program. 
Once a student has been accepted into the law program, the right 
to certification upon completion should be guaranteed upon 
demonstration of competence. Whether the market place can sup-
port them in practice or not should be their prerogative to discover. 
To deny them this right, after accepting their tuition and extending 
them loans, is certainly wasteful and perhaps irresponsible. 
If the specialization of legal knowledge is ever to become a real-
ity in legal education it will be necessary to bring about significant 
changes to the current articling process. The fact that a significant 
number of articling positions arise in the area of corporate law has 
created something of a stranglehold on the future of law students 
interested in other areas of practice. A system needs to be devised, 
preferably with the cooperation of law firms and the bar societies, 
whereby a broader range of practice is available at the articling 
stage. The dominance of articling opportunities in the corporate 
sector has produced the swelling of students pursuing business law 
courses in the curriculum even when it is not their intention to 
practice in this area. The problems associated with such an imbal-
ance have already been noted. 
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Postscript 
Law is everywhere. It seems both impolitic and impractical that 
knowledge of it be vested only in the hands of those whose interest 
in law is narrowly confined to its professional use. Expanding the 
access to legal knowledge beyond the world of lawyers will not un-
dermine the legal profession; the emergence of specialization illus-
trates that the need for lawyers has become even more precisely de-
lineated. But if our society is genuinely concerned with the equi-
table distribution of justice, it might consider furthering that pro-
ject with a more equitable distribution of legal knowledge. 
